Paul Baker 2008-10-26

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On the front cover it says "Gerald Edelman, winner of the Nobel Prize". He was recognized for his contributions to immunology. In this field he characterized the group of proteins known as antibodies. These antibodies are a key element of the adaptive immune system of human beings and similar multicellular organisms. As I went through the book, I observed a number of things. Dr. Edelman seems to have given this subject a lot of thought. There are numerous references. He brings together a number of intellectuals and attempts a synthesis that is perhaps worthy of your attention. The writing is a bit pompous but it still flows in a nice manner. The problem, however, is that his musings seem to go all over the place but never get anywhere. So Dr. E can say a lot of things about the contributors of our understanding to brain physiology as well as consciousness. But so what? How does this affect the future of medicine, fundamental research, or the philosophy of mind? Perhaps it is too difficult to arrive at stronger connections between the mind and the brain for anyone. Dr. E gives it a try but, he doesn't seem to achieve the beauty that I see in his work on antibodies. This might be solved to some extent with more organization. He should know that a journal article has an abstract at the beginning that succinctly tells you what the paper is about. Why he did not extend this usual academic courtesy is bewildering. If he were to do a second edition, the publisher should hire an editor. I believe that the book relies too much on the fact that he did some ground-breaking work decades ago. This book shows that even Nobel Prize winners have times when they just aren't doing great work. They too, are human.

In short, if you know someone who is obsessed with the Nobel, then buy this book as a gift. It even has a nice cover that says "Nobel Prize" on it. The recipient will savor every sentence as if he or she is reading his work from the 1960s. If you want to learn something about how the brain and consciousness connect, then I would go read some real texts with elucidating figures and journal articles with real data.

B. Freedman 2008-04-25

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

I took this book on a vacation, and left it behind half-read in Italy. I hope some reader there enjoys it more or understands what Edelman is saying better than I did....perhaps reading it in English as a second language it will be more understandable. To aid this review I wish I had kept the copy with me so I could cite some of the more aggravating passages, but unfortunately all that is left for me is the feeling that Edelman deliberately writes unclearly because he has so little interesting to say.

I distinctly remember many of his arguments going something like this: if A were true, then B which follows from A must be true. Then he will say: since A is obviously true (he asserts without explaining why), then B is obviously true. I thought I was reading a book that would explain why B would follow from A and why A was true. Instead I got platitudes and non-explanations that more than once had me throwing the book on the floor in disgust.

Edelman may understand what he is trying to say, unfortunately he doesn't communicate this well at all. Perhaps there is meat here, but I sure couldn't find it.

Dr. Lee D. Carlson 2007-11-14

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:

If you take the naturalized epistemology of the philosopher Willard Quine and extend it beyond the role of sense perception, you might arrive at what the author of this book calls "brain-based epistemology." His opinions in this book are very sensible, especially if viewed from the standpoint of what is known in contemporary neuroscience. His expertise in this field is of course well known, but to apply cognitive neuroscience to the understanding of consciousness has only recently been attempted, with some experimental support. Due to its length, the reader will not find a detailed overview of this research in this book, but it will give an introduction to some of the author's essential ideas, which he like to encapsulate in the expression `Neural Darwinism.'

One interesting feature of the author's line of thinking, as in many systems of naturalized epistemology, is that it allows room for both scientific knowledge and knowledge derived from the "humanities". It would seem improbable that evolutionary pressures would not make poetry, art, and literature part of the human survival strategy, given the widespread occurrence of at least one of these areas in all human cultures throughout history. The author would view these areas as expressions of the "pattern recognition" capability of the brain, whereas science and mathematics are more in line with the ability of the brain to indulge itself in logical reasoning. But pattern recognition is the predominant mode for human thinking, with the immediate corollary that metaphors are the tool for which this is done. Scientific reasoning then is a highly specialized (and uncommon) mode of cognition, which is specific in scope and undetermined in justification. This would explain why scientific reasoning does not come as naturally to all as other modes of thought. However, the brain encompasses all of these modes, and so the sciences and the humanities could be viewed as facets of the same brain crystal. To separate them would be fallacious, and therefore the author spends an entire chapter "repairing the rift" between the natural sciences and the humanities.

The author's view of consciousness is one of an unabashed anti-Cartesianism, for he rejects dualism and views consciousness as a purely natural consequence of brain processes, these processes having the nature that they do because of evolutionary pressures. The author also rejects the notion of "brain as computer" but he does believe that it is possible to construct a conscious artifact, and spends a fair amount of time discussing on-going research devoted to this. In addition, and most interestingly, he views language as an "invention" and thus rejects the notion of an innate language mechanism that everyone is born with.

It remains to be seen whether the author's ideas on the origin and nature of consciousness will be justified in further research, but this book does have the virtue that it does not fall into the trap of pure philosophical speculation. This is not to say that such speculation is never of value, but one must know when to stop, when to put down the philosophical drink, lest one become lost in a maze of gigantic conceptual spaces that philosophers love to construct. Experimentation and observation should govern the investigation of consciousness, and artifacts or machines constructed that allow the testing of the more rudimentary ideas proposed. It is refreshing that cognitive neuroscientists have finally given the study of consciousness a genuine place in scientific investigation. No doubt there will be many surprises to come in this investigation in the decades ahead.

Jeanne Sloane 2007-11-10

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Second Nature, suitable for most any reader with a dictionary, is a mind expanding look at the science of the structures and functions of the human brain and how the mysterious activity we call mind arises from the complex interconnectedness between innumerable neurons and our external conditioning and experience. His hypothesis, which puts an end to Descartes' numbing splitting of mind from the physical body, not only gives a convincing explanation of how the wonderful consciousness humans have evolved and developed has arisen, but you can feel it in your head.

meadowreader 2007-05-24

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

Daniel Dennett once characterized Darwin's theory of natural selection as the best single idea anyone ever had. I generally agree with that, so I am naturally well-disposed toward selectionist accounts, of which Edelman's Neural Darwinism is an example. I also have run out of patience with the clever word games that unfortunately constitute far too much of epistemology as it exists in academic philosophy, and that makes me a receptive audience for this kind of selection-based approach. I also agree with Edelman's rejection of computer-based models of human cognition and of Chomksky's mythical language organ. So, yes, I liked the book, found many insights in it, and I recommend it as a stimulating read. All that said, and given the extremely informative review provided below by L. Guzman, I will focus on what I found less than satisfactory.

When it comes to psychology, Edelman's view of the field seems to be bounded by Piaget and Freud. He gives the occasional, semi-perfunctory nod to the environment, but never in serious detail considers the importance for both brain and behavior of the history of interaction between organism and environment. Nor does he show any knowledge of the huge literature describing detailed analyses of environmental effects on behavior, analyses that specifically emphasize the selective effects of environmental consequences. Edelman's account reminds me of how the genome-phenome distinction is sometimes treated in relation to selection, as if genes themselves are directly selected for or against, and then go forth and do things in the world. In this case, it's always the brain doing this or that, with little or no acknowledgment that it is behavior that makes contact with the environment and is subject to selection, with resultant effects on the brain. We know from sensory deprivation experiments that, absent a reasonably normal environment, brain activity quickly drifts into disorder and incoherence. One suspects that the well-known behavior-specific effects of certain brain injuries, which Edelman describes in some detail, have been overgeneralized, resulting in an overly brain-centric view of behavior. What's needed here is an explicit input-output model, where the inputs are the initial state of the organism and the functional characteristics of the environment in which it operates; the fact that computer-based models have used input-output terminology should be considered of no relevance. At some points in Edelman's presentation, I found it difficult to decide just what constituted the output side -- and whether we were ever finally emerging from the neurological realm to the world outside.

A key notion for Edelman is the idea that the organism's inherited neurological structure incorporates biases that will determine something about the way certain stimuli are responded to. This "value system" is considered to be a product of evolutionary history, but it's not entirely clear exactly what the particular functions of this value system are supposed to be. Is it a kind of pre-wiring that makes certain stimuli more salient? For example, the visual appearance and smells associated with a particular species' preferred food might as a matter of inherited tendency trigger consumatory behavior, or at least make it more probable. Besides in-born sensitivity to releasor stimuli, would the value system include inherited behavior itself, ranging from reflexes to simple fixed-action patterns to very complex response sequences? One thinks of the elaborate behavior observed in courtship displays, nest-building, or nurturing the young. Is the notion of value system meant to stand as a neurological-level explanation for the ordinary behavioral effects of reinforcing and punishing consequences? Or is it meant specifically to account for some built-in extreme susceptibility of certain behavior to its consequences, thus amplifying normal reinforcement-punishment effects? Edelman includes the inherited value system as a hypothetical entity or process in his theoretical system, but it's not clear from this book exactly what its functions are, or how they interact with behavior or with the environmental events that precede, accompany, or follow behavior.

In Chapter 12, on Brain-Based Devices, we find, as is typical, that when it comes to actually making something happen the environment suddenly becomes important. Edelman makes much of this extremely interesting work using robotic devices with simulated brains that allow them to learn through trial and error, rather than being driven by pre-programed instructions. It is noteworthy, and completely predictable, that the descriptions of these experiments turn out to be descriptions of (1) the initial structure and behavioral capabilities of the simulated organism, and (2) operations involving the provision of specific environmental stimuli and environmental feedback. Results indicate that interaction with the environment produces changes in the device's behavior and in the organization of its simulated brain. If results didn't turn out that way, the researchers presumably would tinker with (1) and (2) above until they did. One long-term potential here seems to be the rediscovery of behaviorism, but with much better illumination of its neurological underpinnings. That would be an outcome devoutly to be wished, but getting there will require a broader, less brain-centric view than Edelman's alone.