T1818 2008-11-12

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:

Searle here puts fowards an inferential program via a few claims about the mind. Basically there is a bait and switch routine going on here. Searle baits with the mind and then switches to Searle's inferential epistemology. Searle lays down a bunch of inferential rules, inferential rules of every stripe and color which supposedly deliver facts about an underlying reality. Of course, the inferential path is endless once started. There is no way to get at an underlying reality via a chain of inferences. Searle claims that inferences generate facts about an underlying reality but this isn't the case. There is no way to check the chain of inferences. Searle claims truth is function of conditions of satisfaction but conditions of satisfaction are present leaving claims about an underlying reality resulting from a chain of inferences due to fiat rather than proved. A rhetoric is operative here. All these inferences are supposed to generate a 'solid' world and the solidness of the world supposedly generated by the inferences is the selling point of Searle's program but inferentialism doesn't generate a solid world. What is present before one as a consequence of an inferential program is a huge set of inferences rather than a solid world. Basically upon adopting an an inferentialist program, Searle's or Rorty's for example, Searle and Rorty have much in common, one becomes lost in the funhouse.

Edgar Foster 2008-02-18

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:

I used this book to teach a course in the philosophy of human nature and I loved it. Searle touts his brand of philosophy in this work called "biological naturalism." It is the view that all of our conscious states arise from neurobiological processes. The book is also an introduction to the common problems in philosophy of mind. But you better come prepared for a somewhat technical (in some places) discussion of free will, mental causation and the mind-body problem. As usual, however, Searle is crystal clear in his explanations and arguments. Moreover, he appears to be pretty convincing in his refutations of materialism. This book is informative and a pretty good read.

Jesse Rouse 2008-02-03

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

This book served as my introduction to the mind/body problem, and his introductory material (the first 100 pages or so) was actually quite decent. He explained the issues, gave the differing views on the issues, and was rather comprehensive and fair for the most part. The only complaints I had about that section were (1) that he often gave the reader the bare minimum of information and left the reader to figure out what it meant instead of giving a clear example of what he was saying (the issues he was discussing were ofter very difficult to understand, and I would have to read a section and sit and think about it for five minutes to figure out what exactly he was saying, when he could easily have given examples to significantly speed up the process), and (2) I think he unfairly dismissed dualism without really giving many reasons why it was not correct. I agree that there are significant problems with dualism, but I think his treatment of it was far too brief and not especially fair.

The rest of the book, however, was not so great. The position he takes is called non-reductive physicalism. This means that he thinks the mind is nothing but physical processes but is not reducuble to physical processes. The whole rest of the book is about how this theory explains things like consciousness, free will, etc. The two main problems I had with this part of the book are far more significant than those I had with the first part. They are (1) the failure to adequately explain how a mind which is entirely physical processes can escape being reduced to physical processes, and (2) his section on free will.

The reason he wishes to escape reducing the mind to physical processes is that if we do that we are left with determinism. Everything we think, and thus do, is then reduced to the outcome of physical processes leaving no room for free will. The problem is that Searle offers no legitimate explanation of how we escape reductionism if the mind is "just physical processes" (that is exactlty how Searly says it). Other non-reductive physicalists like Nancy Murphy do go into detailed explanations (which I find unconvincing as well), but Searle just passes it off as plausable then moves on, effectively skirting the issue by changing the topic to how this theory explains mental phenomenon like free will.

The problem with that is that when he gets to free will, he is forced to admit that his system does not seem able to account for free will, so he calls it a mystery and appeals to quantum mechanics. He acknowledges that randomness does not amount to freedom (which many who advocate quantum mechanics as the basis of free will fail to acknowledge, so at least it's a step forward), but he is forced to look there for help because, as he notes, it is the only non-determined field of science we know about. Since he has already decided that nothing non-physical can be a part of our minds, he is left with no choice but a listless appeal to quantum mechanics, though he openly admits he has no idea how this solves anything and that it does not really seem to work. Perhaps this is a good indication that his starting point of physicalism is lacking.

In short, this is a good introduction to the mind/brain topic, but his own ideas about the subject are largely unconvincing and seem to me to be rather lacking in evidence. That said, I would recommend it to anyone wishing to learn about these issues, as the non-redcutive physicalism is a growing position you would do well to know about and understand, and Searle presents the one of the most comprehensive discussions of that position in this book. He also presents an excellent critique of reductionist philosophies of mind, from behaviorism to functionalism to the newer theories about how the mind is to brain as computer program is to hardware.

Overall grade: B

Edit (April 11th): In the few months since I read this book, I have actually come to adopt Searle's position (or something very close to it). A number of other sources played in my "conversion," making me wonder whether this really is a good introduction to the topic or something which should be read after a working knowledge of competing positions is already known. It could be that Searle's position was so radically different than my own that I would have rejected it no matter how it was first presented to me, or it could be that Searle's presentation of it was just not as convincing as the positions of Nancy Murphy and Kevin Corcoran in The Search for the Soul (a survey of four views of the soul [or lack thereof] from a Christian perspective), which played a significant role in my shift of positions.

Christopher Richards 2007-12-15

4 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

John Searle provides what he thinks is a corrective to other introductory works in the philosophy of mind. In traditionally Searlean prose, he guides us through what he sees as the major problems of philosophy of mind, giving a background and providing some solutions of his own to the major problems. The writing style is clear, simple, and concise, which makes the book quite readable and indeed pleasant at many points. It is when you begin to dig beneath the words and extract Searle's arguments that the book falls apart.

In the beginning, we see a rather good explication of Descartes' views on the mind, which lead into contemporary approaches to the subject. This is where the book runs into problems. The first approach other than dualism that Searle considers is behaviorism. Here, he betrays philosophical superficiality by completely ignoring the valuable points made by behaviorists and painting a terrible caricature that barely qualifies as a straw man. As he continues, it becomes obvious that Searle has failed to understand virtually every argument in the history of the philosophy of mind. His treatment of functionalism is terribly vague and while his outline of various anti-functionalist arguments is useful, his characterization of their rebuttals is not.

As the work goes on, we get more into Searle's positive work, which is even more muddled than his critical work. He freely contradicts himself, such as in the chapter on free will, where he goes against one of his core philosophical principles (common sense). There is also his theory of consciousness, in which the brain causes the mind, which is separate and sits on top of the brain, but it is not dualism. Such conceptual muddles plague this book, making it difficult to even make sense of what Searle wants to say.

In the end, the book deserves two stars because it causes violent disagreement and is a suitable starting place for discussions and inquiry. However, anyone reading this book would do well to get another introductory book (I recommend Kim) or a good anthology (I recommend Chalmers) to accompany it, because alone the book is wholly inadequate at mapping the field or providing a positive position. It is probably more valuable as an introduction to John Searle, and someone interested in Searle's philosophy of mind would find this an easy way to get acquainted with his ideas.

BTBaron 2007-03-20

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:

I'm not going to present Searle's thesis (or criticize it) here. That's what the book is for. I will point out how many comments this book has, which discuss its critical points--good evidence that it is wonderfully accessible! If you majored in philosophy, went on to other things, but still have an interest in the field, this is the best book on the Philosophy of Mind you can buy. The same goes for high school students looking to explore the subject. Searle consciously aims his book at "young John Searle," so he presents philosophy clearly without dumbing it down. In my opinion, we of the educated public are not looking for "philosophy of the Matrix" written by nobodies; we're looking for book like this: great ideas aimed at an intelligent audience (think philosophy major graduating seniors at Princeton), written by the leading experts in their fields. Come on, old philosophers...your name and ideas might be circulating in the wider public (outside the APA) long after you are!